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DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND FEMINIST
THEORY: A RESPONSE TO POST AND WEINSTEIN
Susan H. Williams*

P

ROFESSORS Robert Post and James Weinstein offer a series
of arguments for democracy as the central value guiding First
Amendment theory, and it is a pleasure to engage with such rich
and important work. Along the way to their conclusion, they suggest that truth and autonomy-the two other, primary contending
values-are less desirable than democracy both theoretically and
as an adequate explanation for existing First Amendment doctrine.1 Their criticisms of these alternatives rest, however, on particular, flawed models of truth and autonomy. Feminist philosophers in both epistemology and moral/political theory have
developed strong critiques of both the traditional, Cartesian model
of truth and the traditional, liberal model of autonomy. These
feminist critiques ground alternative approaches to truth and
autonomy that are not subject to the criticisms raised by Post and
Weinstein. Moreover, a feminist perspective reveals that Post and
Weinstein's democracy theories, while undoubtedly capturing a
central concern of the First Amendment, also rest on a problematic
model of autonomy.
I will begin by responding to their criticisms of the truth and
autonomy theories from the perspective of feminist epistemology
and moral theory. I will then briefly outline the central difficulty
with their democracy theory and the way in which it relies upon a
flawed model of autonomy. Their theories require a division between realms of life in which autonomy must be assumed, which
are defined as public discourse, and realms in which autonomy
need not be recognized. But human experience does not divide in
* Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law and Director, Center for Constitutional Democracy, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I am grateful to Susan Tanner and
Huong Thi Nguyen for their research assistance on this project and to all of the participants in the First Amendment Theory project for the fascinating conversation over
the past two years.
'Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 Va. L. Rev. 477, 48587 (2011) [hereinafter Post, Participatory Democracy].
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this way; the needs for autonomy and community are both interrelated and universal across all areas of life. Both of these critiques
converge on a single, primary point raised by feminist theory: relationships must be seen as central to human experience, including
our experiences of truth and autonomy.
In what follows, I will focus on theory rather than on the fit between theory and existing doctrine. I agree with Post that the point
in constitutional theory "is not to determine what is 'in the abstract' the best possible theory of freedom of speech," but I disagree with his characterization of the goal as "offer[ing] the best
possible account of our actual historical principles." 2 As Professor
C. Edwin Baker has pointed out, a theory may take a more critical
approach to existing case law.' Theory should, of course, explain
the doctrine, but one way of explaining doctrine is to explain why,
in light of the best understanding of our values, the doctrine is
wrong. I believe that theory should also take a critical approach to
the particular conceptualization of our values underlying the doctrine. Theory must address and be consistent with our deep concerns and commitments, but it can do so by criticizing the historical
and present conceptualizations of those commitments.
One might see three levels at work here: on the surface we have
the legal doctrine (for example, the rules categorizing different
types of speech-commercial, sexually explicit, and so forth-and
assigning different levels of protection to different categories); underlying the doctrine we have particular conceptions of values
(such as the participatory model of democracy that Post and
Weinstein support); and at the foundation we have our deep commitments (such as the commitment to autonomy that, I believe,
provides the grounding for this model of democracy). Our theories
must respond to and illuminate these deep foundations, but they
can do so by criticizing both the doctrine and the particular conceptions of value at work in the current law. Indeed, if either the doctrine as a body or the particular conceptions of our values are
taken as a given, then the critical capacity of theory is correspondingly limited. If theory is to go beyond the improvement of current
2

Id.at 477.
'See C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Principle?, 97
Va. L. Rev. 515, 524 (2011).
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approaches and attempt to bring us a deeper understanding of our
fundamental commitments, it must be able to call into question
both the doctrine and the particular conceptions of value that have
animated it. It is precisely such a critique of the dominant conceptualizations of truth and autonomy on which I will base my response.
Post and Weinstein criticize the truth theory of free speech on
several grounds. First, they argue that the search for truth requires
certain forms of discipline that are inconsistent with the First
Amendment's commitment to freedom of speech. Truth is found
through practices that require "respect, reason, fairness, accuracy,
integrity, honesty, logic, and civility."' Because the First Amendment prohibits the government from imposing such disciplining
processes, Weinstein argues that "the premise that a completely
unregulated market of ideas will lead to discovery of truth is highly
contestable."'

This argument could be understood in two different ways. First,
Post and Weinstein might be saying that the truth theory would require government regulation of the speech marketplace (since such
regulatory discipline is necessary for truth to result from the competition), but that the First Amendment, as the Supreme Court has
so far interpreted it, would prevent such regulation. Therefore, the
truth theory is not a good explanation for our current practices under the First Amendment. For the reasons discussed above, I reject
the idea that a theory that fails to cohere with present practices is,
for that reason, unacceptable.
Second, they might be arguing that the truth theory is flawed because it assumes that truth will result from an unregulated speech
market when, in fact, it will not. This criticism may, indeed, apply
to traditional truth theories,6 but it does not apply to the alternative
'Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 1, at 478.
'James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 Va. L. Rev 491, 502 (2011).
6 Although, even with respect to traditional truth theory, there is the response that
Professor Volokh suggests: that truth theory assumes only that a marketplace of ideas
unregulated by the government will lead to truth. It leaves plenty of room for regulation in the interest of accuracy, respect, and so forth by nongovernmental institutions.
See Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a
Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 Va. L. Rev. 595 (2011) [hereinafter Volokh,
Search for Truth].
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models of truth developed by feminist philosophers. The feminist
alternatives generally involve relational models of truth, as opposed to the traditional, Cartesian model.7 As a number of feminist
philosophers have argued, such a relational model avoids many of
the pitfalls of the more traditional model of truth.8 I believe that a
relational model also addresses the important concerns inherent in
our commitment to the value of truth: our need for both shared reality and deep critique, the demand that we pay attention to the
impact of our decisions on subjects who matter, and our desire for
connection to nonhuman reality.9 Finally, and most relevant to the
criticisms raised by Post and Weinstein, a relational model of truth,
in which truth is understood as constructed through certain social

'Cartesianism is an epistemological position in which truth is understood as a characteristic of beliefs: a true belief is one that accurately describes or reflects reality.
Reality is objective: it exists independent of our understanding or perception of it and
independent of our moral and political values. A person acquires knowledge of this
objective reality through the use of his or her reason, sometimes supplemented by his
or her sense perceptions. These faculties are independent of a person's social context:
reason is the same for everyone, everywhere. As a result, knowledge is universally
valid. There cannot be multiple, equally valid truths; there is only one truth. See Alison M. Jagger & Susan R. Bordo, Introduction, in Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing 1, 3 (Alison M. Jagger & Susan R. Bordo
eds., 1989).
"For general background on the feminist criticisms of Cartesianism and the development of alternative, relational models of truth, see generally Discovering Reality:
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy
of Science ix-x (Sandra Harding & Merrill Hintikka eds., 1983); Sandra Harding,
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives viii-xi (1991);
Jagger & Bordo, supra note 7, at 1-3.
See Susan H. Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech: Feminist Theory and the
First Amendment 95-129 (2004) (explaining these concerns and the way in which a
relational model addresses them) [hereinafter Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and
Speech]. Because it connects the search for truth to these underlying ethical/political
considerations, a relational model of truth also avoids the criticism Weinstein raises
about grounding free speech on an instrumental rather than an inherent value. See
Weinstein, supra note 5. On this model of truth, speech is valuable not primarily because of what the truth-seeking process produces (in terms of information) but because of the moral relations created between people in the process itself. In this sense,
it is exactly parallel to Weinstein and Post's argument for democracy. This inherent
value of truthseeking is, perhaps, part of what Volokh had in mind when he described
"the right to uncover the truth for oneself and as the right to participate in the continuing development of human knowledge." Volokh, Search for Truth, supra note 6,
at 600-01.
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relationships, would lead to a different understanding of the range
of acceptable government regulations.' °
The reason for the difference is that this model of truth reintegrates the ethical and political values that a more Cartesian model
of truth attempts to exile from epistemology.' As Post's description of the truth-seeking process indicates, such ethical/political
values as respect, integrity, honesty, and civility are a necessary
part of the foundation for the search for truth.12 When truth is understood in ways that make these moral/political preconditions
clear, then the truth theory is itself a blend of cognitive values with
moral/political ones.
Where the government is regulating speech practices for the
purpose of ensuring that the ethical/political preconditions that allow for the pursuit of truth are met, such regulations are not invalid
for that reason (although they may, of course, be invalid for some
other reason). The government does not need the power to "judge
ideas as true or false, as better or worse"' 3 for free speech to serve
the search for truth, but it does need the power to enforce the
moral and political preconditions under which the search for truth
progresses. In other words, within a relational truth theory, government regulations that guarantee such preconditions are not presumptively invalid in the same way as government efforts to prescribe the outcome of the truth-seeking process."
Similarly, the criticisms Post and Weinstein raise concerning
autonomy theory are largely inapplicable to the alternative models

See Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech, supra note 9, at 175-98.
"Post suggests that "First Amendment jurisprudence is thus best interpreted as expressing ethical or political values, rather than cognitive values." Post, Participatory
Democracy, supra note 1, at 479.
2 Id. at 478.
13Id. at 487.
14See Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech, supra note 9, at 186-88. Knowing
10

which of these two is the more accurate description of the government regulation at
issue is one of the many difficult judgment calls required by the First Amendment. Of
course, every theory of free speech requires such difficult judgments on which reasonable people will differ. The issue, then, is whether a given theory offers (1) a reasonably practical explanation of how we should think about and argue about these questions and (2) an explanation of why this hard question is important enough to justify
the struggle and attention that it will require. Cf. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 1, at 488 (arguing that the hard questions in democracy theory are "in the
last analysis, the value judgments that we ought to be making").
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of autonomy developed by feminists. Post and Weinstein criticize
autonomy theory on two primary grounds. First, the value of
autonomy is not unique to speech and, therefore, would lead to a
scope of protection that is both impractically large and inconsistent
with the First Amendment's focus on speech. 5 Second, the autonomy value cannot decide those cases in which the autonomy of the
speaker conflicts with the autonomy of the audience. 6 For a narrative autonomy theory, however, the first criticism does not apply,
and the second, while identifying a real issue in many cases, is not
disabling.
A narrative autonomy theory identifies the central exercise of
autonomy not in the moment of choice but in the ongoing process
of telling one's own story. This model of autonomy is, like the alternative model of truth discussed above, fundamentally relational.
It is also fundamentally expressive. In a narrative model of autonomy, the central focus is not on an act of volition but on the activity
of interpretation and the creation of meaning.
The connection between narrative autonomy and speech is,
therefore, exactly parallel to the connection Post and Weinstein
see between their democracy theory and speech. As Baker argues,
this democracy theory is actually an autonomy theory applied to
18
democracy. 7 As opposed to Meiklejohn's democracy theory
(which focuses on the value of speech to the citizen listener who
would use the information to make public decisions), Post and
Weinstein endorse a theory focused on the citizen speaker (whose
participation on terms that respect his autonomy is the necessary
foundation for a legitimate democracy). In other words, this version of democracy theory is essentially an autonomy theory limited
to the scope of democratic politics, 9 where democratic politics is

" See Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 1, at 479; Weinstein, supra note 5,
at 503.
16See Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 1, at 480. I do not consider their
third criticism-that autonomy theory is inconsistent with certain lines of current doctrine-for the reasons discussed earlier.
,7See Baker, supra note 3, at 523.
See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (1948).
'9 Indeed, one of the difficulties with the theory explored by Professor Seana Shiffrin in her comments is the lack of explanation for why and how this autonomy con-
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understood in terms of a particular model of public dialogue. As a
result, autonomy is connected to speech by way of democracy: because democracy centers on public dialogue, the First Amendment
focuses on speech, as opposed to other activities or choices through
which people might exercise their autonomy.
An autonomy theory that sees the locus of autonomy in narrative works exactly the same way. By focusing on the mechanisms
through which people tell their own stories, this model explains
why autonomy is particularly connected to speech. Speech, understood broadly, is our primary mechanism for interpretation and
meaning creation. Thus, a narrative autonomy theory is not subject
to the same criticism as a choice-based autonomy theory, which
might apply to the broad range of choices with no specific connection to speech.'
The second criticism concerns the potential for conflicts between
the autonomy of a speaker and the autonomy of the audience. This
potential is real and important, and it makes for some hard cases.
There is, however, no inconsistency or incoherence here and such
conflicts are not irresolvable. The real issue, as Post points out, is
whether a theory can "illuminate[] the normative stakes in such
cases" by providing resources for assessing the relative weight of
competing claims and tools for accommodating each claim as much
as possible.2'
A narrative autonomy theory can do this. For example, a narrative autonomy theory highlights the autonomy interests on both
sides in the issue of campaign finance regulation. In a narrative
model, the autonomy claims of the speaker, while real, are reduced
in significance, while the autonomy claims of other, would-be participants in the political dialogue appear more clearly and as more
pressing. 2 Thus, recognizing autonomy issues on both sides is not
cern is limited to politics. See Seana Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech Theory, 97
Va. L. Rev. 549 (2011).
20A narrative autonomy theory also offers a distinctive perspective on the connection between democracy and free speech. From this perspective, politics is seen as
central not only to policy formation but also to the construction of identity and social
relations. As a result, the need for a public dialogue based on practices of respect and
responsibility is made clear and central. See Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech,
supra note 9, at 224-29.
See Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 1, at 485.
See Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech, supra note 9, at 210-21.
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disabling as long as the theory provides tools for weighing the relative importance of the competing claims.
Indeed, I would argue that the fact that a free speech theory can
recognize competing claims on both sides of a case is a virtue
rather than a flaw. It is an intellectual and moral virtue in a theory
that it can recognize the reality that the values protected by free
speech can be at issue on both sides in a case and that there may be
no way to decide without sacrificing some of them. Conversely, a
theory that neatens up our moral conflicts in ways that suggest a
clear "right" answer, with nothing of value lost, can lead to a dangerous self-righteousness that simply refuses to recognize the costs
our values sometimes impose.23 A theory is stronger if it can acknowledge the inevitability of occasional tragic choices in constitutional law and can help us to accept the responsibility such choices
entail for addressing the "moral remainder" in other ways. '
Finally, the democracy theory proposed by Post and Weinstein
raises some difficulties of its own. In my view, the most serious of
these difficulties concerns the distinction between the realm of
public democratic discourse and other speech. This distinction is
central to the democracy theory's claim to be able to contain the
sphere of greatest First Amendment protection to a manageable
size and to justify the lower level of protection afforded to other
sorts of speech. This distinction, however, rests on a division between different models of the person, each of which applies in a
different realm. In the realm of public discourse, persons are (and
must be treated as) autonomous; outside of this realm, persons are
(and may be treated as) constituted by community-based norms
and understandings and therefore, in the sense that Post and
Weinstein care about, nonautonomous 5

On the importance of recognizing tragic choices rather than trying to create a
moral system that defines them out of existence, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness 26, 31-32 (1986).
24On the issue of moral remainders and their relevance to free speech law, see
Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech Theory, 68 Tul. L. Rev.
1563, 1579-80 (1994).
See Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 1, at 482-85; see also Robert C.
Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management 10, 188 (1995)
[hereinafter Post, Constitutional Domains]. This description ignores the third domain
Post discusses in his book: management. For the purposes of the discussion in these
papers-in which the most important line is the one between public discourse and all
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Other commentators have already noted that this division between public discourse and the rest of life is inherently unstable.26
They have also noted the widely shared, considered judgment that
much speech outside of public discourse-the conversations in the
kitchen, bedroom, or classroom-should be entitled to strong First
Amendment protection." I agree with these criticisms, but I would
like to point to a different difficulty with this dividing line between
public discourse and the rest of life: this division rests on and institutionalizes the idea that these two different models of the person
(as autonomous, on the one hand, and as constituted by social connections, on the other) can and should be separated into different
realms of life. We are autonomous in the realm of public discourse,
but are socially constituted in other aspects of life. In addition to
being impractical in application, as the other commentators have
pointed out, I believe that this division is: (1) false as a matter of
our experience of these different aspects of our lives; (2) conceptually untenable; and (3) based on an inadequate model of autonomy.
The division is false as a matter of experience, because we experience a need for both social constitution and autonomy within
all of the different domains in our lives. Within the domain of
community, as Post would identify it, we have a need for autonomy
as well as connection. As Professor Steven Shiffrin has pointed out,
even within many institutions not devoted to public discourseschools, hospitals, workplaces, and so on-we experience injustice,
and we want and need the resources to respond to that injustice
with autonomous speech and action that contests the accepted
norms of that institution (that is, dissent).28

other speech-the distinction between management and community is much less significant than the distinction between the domain of democracy and everything else. I
am emphasizing the role of community on the other side of this line because I believe
that the demands of community capture deep normative imperatives, while those of
management are primarily a matter of prudential concern.
' See Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation, and First Amendment
Methodology, 97 Va. L. Rev. 559, 561-64 (2011); Eugene Volokh, The Trouble with
"Public Discourse" as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 Va. L. Rev. 567 (2011).
27See Baker, supra note 3, at 523; Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 564.
' See Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 562; see also Steven H. Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice
and the Meanings of America 89-91 (2000).
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Conversely, I suggest that we also experience a need for the imposition of communal norms within the realm of political autonomy, such as norms concerning equal respect. I suspect that Post
and Weinstein would assert that, while we can argue about these
norms within public discourse, the norms should not be used as a
basis for regulating public discourse itself. In a moment, I will address why I believe such a restriction on the use of these norms is
conceptually untenable. Right now, what I am arguing is that our
experience of democratic politics demonstrates that people feel a
powerful need to use these norms in this way. Such a need might,
in the end, be something we must deny rather than satisfy, but our
experience suggests that we must recognize and come to terms with
that need. So, our experience does not support this division.
Second, the division between the two models of the person is
conceptually untenable, because each model requires and incorporates the other. Post has clearly recognized the practical interdependence of the different domains he describes.29 The interdependence is, however, conceptual rather than merely practical: the very
concept of community or autonomy requires the incorporation of
the other, such that separating them is conceptually impossible.
The concept of community relies upon autonomy because socially constituted persons are never simply carbon copies of the
community's ideal or norm. Both cultural studies, generally, and
feminist theory, in particular, have highlighted the "essentially contestable" nature of cultural norms." There is an inevitable exercise
of autonomy in the interpretation, application, and evolution of
communal norms and values. Community is, in other words, imand not only practically-without autonpossible-conceptually
3
omy. 1

Similarly, autonomy is not possible without community. As Post
recognizes, the very meaning and boundaries of public discourse
are set by certain substantive value commitments: he identifies self29See Post, Constitutional Domains, supra note 25, at 192-93.
30

See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 495, 514 (2001).
course, the degree of autonomy that is encouraged or viewed as appropriate
may vary in different communities. That is why it makes sense for people concerned
about autonomy to worry about the degree to which a given community provides the
resources and opportunities necessary for the development of autonomy. See Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech, supra note 9, at 154.
31 Of
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determination and critical reflection as among these values.32 He
writes that "[t]he boundary between public discourse and nonpublic discourse is... ultimately a normative one., 33 But the normative
commitments do not stop at the boundary. If the notion of critical
reflection has any content at all, then the fabric of public discourse,
and not merely its boundary, is shaped by our collective normative
commitments as well. What counts as an appropriate (or even recognizable) contribution to this discourse depends on the community's understanding of
34 normative concepts like reflection, discourse, and autonomy.
In fact, the tension between autonomy and community is internal to each and every domain. We cannot resolve this tension by
allocating the protection of one model of the person to one realm
of life and the protection of the other model to a different realm.
We need both aspects of personhood in all aspects of life, from the
most private of family matters to the most public of political arenas.
The appropriate balance between autonomy and community
may well be different in different areas of life, but this is a difference of degree rather than of kind. If the notion of the public domain is merely intended to point to the fact that, in some areas of
life, our need for autonomy is generally more pressing than our
need for community, then it is a useful reminder. Understood in
32See Post, Constitutional Domains, supra note 25, at 142-43.

See Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 1, at 485.
4 1 believe that Post recognizes this conceptual interdependence between community and autonomy. See Post, Constitutional Domains, supra note 25, at 146 ("[W]e
must understand rational reflection as itself a form of social action that depends for its
fulfillment upon a specific normative structure."). At times, however, his language
seems to suggest that the domain of democracy really is neutral and that the commitments to self-determination and critical thinking represent a rejection of the claims of
particular communities rather than being themselves the normative commitments of a
particular community. See, e.g., id. at 138 ("The constitutional 'shield' established by
Cantwell ensures that this competition [between communities] occurs on a level playing field, in which no particular community can obtain an unfair advantage and use
the power of the state to prejudge the outcome of this competition by enforcing its
own special norms or civility rules. This [is a] special neutrality ... "); id. at 144 ("At
root, therefore, the concept of critical interaction depends upon the continuous possibility of transcending what is taken for granted."). My suggestion in the text associated with this footnote is that, if this relationship between autonomy and community
is taken seriously, it calls into question the definition and role of the domain of public
discourse in the democracy theory.
3
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this limited way, however, the notion of the public domain is only a
rough rule of thumb, which might often be overridden by a more
finely grained contextual analysis of a particular case. Moreover,
understood in this pragmatic way, the notion of the public domain
would not be tied to this division between different models of the
self.
In response to this argument at the conference, Post suggested
that, even if this interrelation between autonomy and community is
true as a matter of moral theory and experience, it would still make
sense to create this division between them as a matter of First
Amendment law. Of course, all theory abstracts from experience to
some extent and, therefore, will fail to match it perfectly. But
building First Amendment theory on the foundation of public discourse, understood in terms of this division of domains between
autonomy and community, is not so much an abstraction from experience as a contradiction of it. If my description is accurate as a
moral and experiential matter and we do need both autonomy and
community in all of these domains, then a First Amendment theory
that imposes this artificial division will fail to meet our needs. In35
deed, such a theory will miss half of what is at stake in many cases.
Finally, I would like to suggest that the difficulties the democracy theory has with defining and defending this division between
the public domain and the rest of life arise, at least in part, from
the particular model of autonomy that is at the heart of this theory.
It is because autonomy is seen as threatened by the imposition of
community norms that this division becomes important and the
boundary of the public domain must be defended. If autonomy
were understood in a more relational way, then the contribution of
communal norms to the creation and maintenance of autonomy
would be clearer.36 I would argue that autonomy is dependent upon
" I believe the strongest evidence for this claim is provided by some of the examples
that Post offers, such as his suggestion that political conversations between family
members would be a "close" case for core First Amendment protection. See Post,
Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 Va. L. Rev. 617,
623 (2011).
For a sampling of feminist criticisms of the traditional model of autonomy and
suggestions for more relational models, see Diana T. Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice 42-50 (1989); Marilyn Friedman, Self-Rule in a Social Context: Autonomy from a Feminist Perspective, in Freedom, Equality, and Social Change 158, 158
(Creighton Peden & James P. Sterba eds., 1989); Jean Grimshaw, Autonomy and
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our relations to others at three levels: causally (we learn to be
autonomous from others), substantively (the substance of our
choices/stories is a product of communal norms and understandings), and conceptually (the very meaning of autonomy-in terms
of its relation to self-respect, integrity of the person, responsibility
and so on-cannot be understood separate from our relations to
others)." In this alternative approach to autonomy, communal
norms and relations are crucial to facilitate autonomy, and autonomy is crucial to maintain community. There is, of course, tension
between them, but both must be sustained within each realm of
life. The issue then becomes the balance between the two, and this
is an issue that requires great attention to the details of particular
contexts, institutions, and social practices. Public discourse, on this
view, does not mark the domain in which autonomy is the paramount value; autonomy and community are values on both sides of
that line.
Democracy theory's flaw, then, arises from its insistence on dividing the realm of autonomy from that of community by way of
the concept of public discourse. This division rests, in turn, on a
model of autonomy that does not give sufficient weight to the role
of communal norms in grounding and facilitating autonomy (and
vice versa). The result of that model is an understanding of the
First Amendment that gives insufficient protection to the claims of
autonomy outside of public discourse and insufficient protection to
the claims of community within public discourse. Freedom of
speech would be better served, I believe, by a theory that starts
from a relational model of truth and autonomy.

Identity in Feminist Thinking, in Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy 90, 90-91
(Morwenna Griffiths & Margaret Whitford eds., 1988); Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoijar, Introduction, in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self 3, 3-5 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds.,
2000); Diana T. Meyers, The Socialized Individual and Individual Autonomy, in
Women and Moral Theory 139 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987);
Trudy Govier, Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem, 8 Hypatia 99, 101-04 (1993);
Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities, 1
Yale J.L. & Feminism 7, 7-9 (1989).
17 See Williams, Truth, Autonomy, and Speech, supra note 9, at 59-66, 150-54.
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